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Abstract
We propose fast probabilistic algorithms with low (i.e., sublinear in the input size) commu-
nication volume to check the correctness of operations in Big Data processing frameworks and
distributed databases. Our checkers cover many of the commonly used operations, including
sum, average, median, and minimum aggregation, as well as sorting, union, merge, and zip. An
experimental evaluation of our implementation in Thrill (Bingmann et al., 2016) confirms the
low overhead and high failure detection rate predicted by theoretical analysis.
1 Introduction
Recently, Big Data processing frameworks like Apache Spark [1], Apache Flink [2] and Thrill [3]
have surged in popularity and are widely used to process of large amounts of data. Computation and
data are distributed over a large number of machines connected by a fast network, and processing
is based on collective operations that transform datasets. As compute performance and memory
capacity continue to grow (“Moore’s Law”) while simultaneously becoming ever cheaper, oftentimes
all data can be held in main memory. Combined, these advances let users process enormous amounts
of data quickly. However, as the number of machines increases, so does the rate of hardware failures
and thus the importance of fault tolerance, as well as the difficulty of writing correct programs that
handle all edge cases. Some frameworks, e.g. Apache Spark, can deal with failing machines [1], but
none of the popular solutions can detect silent errors. These can be the result of subtle errors in
the programming, but also spontaneous bitflips in memory (“soft errors”), caused for example by
cosmic rays [4]—a concern that can largely be mitigated by using ECC RAM, but at the cost of
increased hardware expenditure. We propose probabilistic algorithms to detect silent failures in the
frameworks’ operations with little overhead, which we refer to as checkers. These checkers verify
the integrity of the computation while treating the operation as a black box, i.e. independent of its
implementation. Our checkers cover many of the commonly used operations of current-generation
data-parallel computing frameworks.
Consider the options available to a programmer who wants to increase users’ confidence in
the correctness of her program. Formal verification would be ideal, but very difficult for complex
programs and does not address hardware errors. Testing can help the programmer to avoid mistakes,
but cannot prove the absence of bugs. Lastly, she can write a small and fast program that verifies
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Table 1: Our main results. Parameters: input size n; number of processing elements (PEs) p;
failure probability δ; machine word size w; trade-off parameter d; communication startup cost α;
communication cost per bit β
Operation
Broadcast
Result?
Certificate
Required?
Checker Running Time O(⋅)
Sum/Count Agg. no no (n
p
+ βdw) logd 1δ + α log p
Average Agg. no dist same as above
Median Agg. yes yesa same as above
Minimum Agg. yes yes np + α log p
Permutation, Sort, Union,
Merge, Zip, GroupByb,
Joinb
no no ( n
pw
+ β) log 1
δ
+ α log p
a no certificate required if input elements are distinct.
b invasive checker for input redistribution phase.
the output of the main program: a checker. The checker must be very fast to avoid large slowdowns,
much faster than the main program. The probabilistic checkers we consider here make a favorable
trade-off between confidence and speed.
In distributed computing, communication latency and bandwidth limitations are among the
main limiting factors. Our main optimization criterion is therefore the maximum amount of data
sent or received at any single processing element (PE), as the slowest PE determines overall running
time. In a previous paper [5] we proposed to intensify the search for algorithms with low bottleneck
communication volume. More precisely, consider an input of n fixed-size elements distributed over
the p PEs such that every PE holds O(n/p) elements. Then we want no PE to send or receive
more than o(n/p) elements, or be part in more than a polylogarithmic number of data exchanges
(messages).
In this paper, we adopt the terminology of Thrill [3] for operations. We also design our checkers
to become part of it, and implemented them within Thrill for our experiments.
Note that the majority of our results also apply to distributed database systems. The proximity
between data-parallel big data processing frameworks and distributed databases is exemplified by
the SQL layer of Apache Spark [6].
Table 1 lists our main results. For each operation, it states whether the entire result needs to be
available at all PEs (or a distributed result suffices), whether the checker requires a certificate—and
if yes, whether a distributed certificate suffices—and the checker’s running time.
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2 Preliminaries
Let an operation’s input data set consist of n elements, each represented by a fixed number of
machine words1, and let k denote the number of elements in the output of a particular operation,
and let w be the machine word size in bits. Consider p processing elements (PEs) connected
by a network, numbered 1..p, where a..b is shorthand for {a, . . . , b} throughout this paper. We
assume that PEs can send and receive at most one message simultaneously (full-duplex, single-ported
communication). Then, sending a message of size m bits takes time α+βm, where α is the time to
initiate a connection and β the time to send a single bit over an already-established connection. We
treat α and β as variables in asymptotic analysis. Thus, a running time of O(x + βy +αz) allows
us to discuss internal work x, communication volume y, and the number of messages (or latency) z
separately. Frequently, all three aspects are important, and combining them into a single expression
for running time allows for a concise representation.
Throughout this paper, logarithms with an unspecified base are binary logarithms: logx ∶=
log2 x.
Error Model Checkers have one-sided error: they are never allowed to reject the result of a
correct computation. Only in the case of an incorrect result are they allowed to erroneously accept
with a small probability, limited by the parameter δ > 0.
Distribution of Input We usually assume that the n input elements are distributed over the
p PEs such that each PE holds O(n/p) elements. This is mainly in order to simplify notation.
A generalization would usually involve an additional term proportional to the maximum number
of elements located on any PE. Note that we explicitly do not assume random distribution of the
input, as that would require redistribution of the entire input in cases where this is not the case
already.
Certificates Some operations become much easier to check if the result of the operation is ac-
companied by a certificate to facilitate checking. However, when an algorithm provides an output
along with a certificate for said output, the certificate might also be faulty. We need to take care
not to accept incorrect results because the certificate contains the same flaw, i.e. we need to verify
the correctness of the certificate as well.
Collective Communication A broadcast distributes a message to all PEs. Reduction applies
an associative operation to a sequence of k bits. In an all-reduction, the result is also broadcast.
All of these operations can be performed in time Tcoll(k) ∶= O(βk +α log p) [7, 8]. In an all-to-all
communication, every PE sends k bits to every other PE. This can be performed in Tall-to-all(k) ∶=
O(βk +αp) using direct delivery or O(βk log p + α log p) using hypercube indirect delivery [9]
Hashing To simplify analysis, we assume the availability of random hash functions, i.e. hash
functions chosen uniformly at random from the set of all mapping between the input and output
value types. Then, hash values can be treated like numbers chosen uniformly at random from the
1Oftentimes, adaptation to variable sized objects is possible. Our focus on fixed size objects is mainly to simplify
notation.
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hash functions’ image space. We explain separately when weaker guarantees on the randomness of
the hash function suffice.
Reduction A reduce operation collects elements by their keys, processing all elements of the
same key in an arbitrary order using an associative reduce function f ∶ Value×Value → Value. This
function describes how two combine two elements into one. To reduce the local elements of a PE,
we use a hash table h. Process elements one-by-one, denoting the current element by e = (k, v),
and set h[k] = f(v,h[k]) or h[k] = f(v,0) if h[k] does not exist. We then use a simple reduction
algorithm (see “Collective Communication” above) to obtain the final result at PE 0. The total time
taken is O(n/p + Tcoll(wk)) = O(n/p + βwk + α log p).
GroupBy A more general approach to aggregation is GroupBy, where all elements with a certain
key are collected at one PE and processed by the group function g ∶ [Value] → Value. This enables
the use of more powerful operators such as computing median, but requires more communication.
Total running time is O(n/p + Tall-to-all(wn/p)) = O(n/p + βwn +αp).
Result Integrity When the output of an operation or a certificate is provided at all PEs rather
than in distributed form, we need to ensure that all PEs received the same output or certificate.
This can be achieved by hashing the data in question with a random hash function, and comparing
the hash values of all other PEs. This can be achieved in time O(k +α log p) by broadcasting the
hash of PE 0, which every PE can compare to its own hash, and aborting if any PE reports a
difference.
3 Related Work
We were surprised to find that distributed, let alone communication efficient, probabilistic checkers
appear to be a largely unstudied problem. We therefore give a short overview of techniques for
increasing confidence in the output of a program.
From a theoretical standpoint, formally verifying the correctness of a program is the ultimate
goal. While tremendous progress has been made in this area (e.g. [10]), verifying implementations
of complex distributed algorithms in popular programming languages is still infeasible.
In practice, programs are often tested against a set of test cases of known good input/output
pairs, ensuring that the program computes the correct result without crashing for all test cases.
However, testing can never demonstrate the absence of bugs.
Blum and Kannan [11] introduce probabilistic checkers in a sequential setting. McConnell
et al. [12] build upon this to design (sequential) certifying algorithms, stressing the importance of
simplicity of the checker, and putting increased focus on certificates (also termed witnesses) that
prove that the output is correct. While formally verifying the algorithm may be infeasible, doing so
for the verifier may be within reach. As a result, one can use fast but complicated algorithms that
may be beyond the programmer’s competence to fully understand, while maintaining certainty in
the correctness of the result.
Verification of arbitrary computations performed by a single machine or outsourced to a set of
untrusted machines is a well-studied problem, dating back over 25 years and published under names
such as “verifiable computing” [13], “checking computations” [14], or “delegating computations” [15].
All of these are computationally expensive beyond the limits of feasibility, despite recent efforts
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to make verifiable computing more practical [16]. A recent survey by Walfish and Blumberg [17]
concludes that “[t]he sobering news, of course, is these systems are basically toys” due to orders-of-
magnitude overhead. In contrast, our work focuses on checking specific operations, allowing us to
develop checkers that are fast in practice.
An approach that has received significant attention for linear algebra kernels is Algorithm-Based
Fault Tolerance (ABFT) [18, 19]. By encoding the input using checksums, and modifying the
algorithms to work on encoded data, ABFT techniques detect and correct any failure on a single
processor. However, this requires the algorithms to be redesigned to operate on the encoded data.
Note that while some existing systems, e.g. Apache Spark [1], implement some fault tolerance
measures such as detecting and handling the failure of individual nodes, there are large classes of
failures that no existing big data processing system appears to detect or mitigate. These include
data corruption caused by soft errors, i.e. incorrectly handled edge cases in the programming,
or bitflips in CPU or main memory caused by cosmic rays, leak voltage, as well as hard errors,
i.e. device defects causing repeated failure at the same memory locations. A common solution to
memory errors is the use of ECC RAM [20], which can correct most soft errors and detect (but
often not correct) many hard errors [21]. This is orthogonal to our checkers: a checker can never
detect errors introduced into the input data before the algorithm is invoked, so the use of ECC
RAM remains advisable even when computations can be checked.
4 Count and Sum Aggregation
Reductions are perhaps the most important operation in the kind of Big Data systems we consider,
and the paradigm they extend even carried them in their name: MapReduce. The checker we
describe works not only for sum aggregation, but also other operations on integers that fulfill
certain properties. We require that the reduce operator ⊕ be associative, commutative, and satisfy
x⊕ y ≠ x for all y ≠ 0, i.e. every element except the neutral element changes the result. Examples
include count aggregation, which conceptually equals sum aggregation where the value of every
element is mapped to 1, and exclusive or (xor). Without loss of generality, we therefore only discuss
sum aggregation in this section. Several other common choices of reduce functions violating the
above requirements and aggregations requiring the additional power of GroupBy are discussed in
Section 6.
In sum aggregation, we are given a distributed set of (key, value)-pairs. Let K be the (unknown)
set of keys in the input and k ∶= ∣K ∣ its equally unknown size. The output of sum aggregation then
consists of a single value for each key, which is the sum of all values associated with it in the input.
In SQL, this operation would be expressed as
SELECT key, SUM(value) FROM table GROUP BY key.
Theorem 1. Let ⊕ be an associative and commutative reduce function on integers satisfying x⊕y ≠ x
for all elements x, y with y ≠ 0. Then ⊕-aggregation of n elements with failure probability at most
δ can be checked in time Tcheck-sum(n,p, δ) ∶= O((np + βdw) logd 1δ +α log p), where d is a tuning
parameter.
Note that only the local work depends on the input size, and that the running time is independent
of the number of keys.
To check the result of such an aggregation, we apply a naïve sum reduction algorithm to a
condensed version of the input. We shall sometimes refer to this as the minireduction in subsequent
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def checkSumAgg(v : Element[ni], o : Element[ki], δ : R) : Boolean
(d, rˆ) ∶ N ×N := numerically determined parameters (see Table 2)
r ∶ N := random number from rˆ+1..2rˆ –– modulus parameter
h ∶K → 1..d := random hash function –– maps keys to buckets
wv := cRed(v, d, r, h) –– apply condensed reduction to input
wo := cRed(o, d, r, h) –– ...and asserted result of sum aggregation
return wv = wo –– significant only at PE 0
def cRed(arr : Element[], d : N, r : N; h : K → 1..d) : Value[d]
t ∶ Value[d] = ⟨0, . . . ,0⟩
foreach (k, v) ∈ arr
t[h[k]] := (v + t[h[k]]) mod r –– local reduction
Reduce(t, +r, 0) –– reduce to PE 0 with addition modulo r
return t –– significant only at PE 0
Algorithm 1: A single iteration of the sum aggregation checker. Here, v is the input to the sum
aggregation operation, a sequence of n elements of which PE i holds ni; o is the asserted result with
ki out of k elements at PE i; and δ is the maximum allowed failure rate.
sections. Let d from the statement of Theorem 1 be the size of the condensed key space, with
2 ≤ d ≪ k. We then use a random hash function h ∶ K → 1..d to map the original keys to the
reduced key space. Let rˆ ≥ d be a modulus parameter, with r chosen uniformly at random from
the half-open interval (rˆ,2rˆ]. Apply a naïve sum reduction modulo r to the thus-remapped input
and—separately—the output of the aggregation algorithm. If both produce the same result, the
operation was likely conducted correctly. Pseudocode is given in Algorithm 1.
Lemma 2. A single iteration of the above sum aggregation checker fails with probability at most 1
rˆ
+ 1
d
.
Proof. If the aggregation was performed correctly, then the per-bucket results in the reduced key-
space are the same for input and output, and thus the checker always accepts a correct result. Thus
assume from now on that the output of the aggregation operation is incorrect, i.e. the checker
should fail.
For i ∈ K, let ni be the (correct, unknown) ⊕-aggregate of all values with key i, and n′i be the
asserted such value. Then, as the result is incorrect, there exists at least one i with ni ≠ n
′
i. Let
I ∶= {i ∈K ∣ ni ≠ n′i} be the keys whose results were computed incorrectly by the operation.
Let h ∶K → 1..d be the random hash function used to map keys to the condensed keyspace. We
use this hash function to map elements to the d buckets by their keys, and reduce the values in
associated counters modulo r, where r is chosen uniformly at random from (rˆ,2rˆ]. Effectively, we
operate in the residue class ring Z/rZ. Thus the checker fails if
∀j∈1..d ∶ ⊕
i∈I
h(i)=j
ni = ⊕
i∈I
h(i)=j
n′i mod r.
We prove the claimed failure probability by first considering the failure modes introduced by
the modulus, and then analyzing a version of the checker without a modulus. In this second part,
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we injectively map each hash function h for which the checker fails to d − 1 distinct hash functions
for which it does not fail.
(1) If there is an i ∈ I with ni = n
′
i mod r, the checker cannot detect the error in this key. For
a single key, this occurs with probability r−1 ≤ rˆ−1 by definition of r. However, for the checker to
fail, ni = n
′
i mod r must hold for all i ∈ I. Thus, the probability of failure declines exponentially
with ∣I ∣, and ∣I ∣ = 1 is the hardest case. Therefore, rˆ−1 bounds the total additional failure probability
introduced by the modulus.
(2) Define F ∶= {h ∶K → 1..d ∣ checker fails for h} and let ı˘ ∶= min I be the first key with mis-
matched aggregate value. For each h ∈ F , we define the d − 1 hash functions hj with
∀j∈1..d∖{h(ı˘)}, i∈K ∶ hj(i) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
h(i) i ≠ ı˘,
j else
and let F ∶= {hj ∣ h ∈ F, j ∈ 1..d ∖ {h(˘ı)}}. Clearly, the checker does not fail for any hj ∈ F , as exactly
one element with different values is being remapped in a hash function for which it does fail (the
case of nı˘ = n
′
ı˘ mod r is treated in (1)). By the assumption x⊕ y ≠ x for y ≠ 0, the result will differ
in exactly two buckets, and the checker will notice.
We also need to show that the mapping is injective, i.e. that the new hash functions are unique
and thus ∣F ∣ = (d − 1) ∣F ∣. Clearly, for given h all of its hj are different, so assume that there exists
an h′ ≠ h and j, j′ so that hj = h′j′ ∈ F . Then, by definition, j = hj (˘ı) = h′j′ (˘ı) = j′ and thus j = j′.
For hj = h′j , we furthermore need
∀i∈K ∶ hj(i) = h′j(i) def.⇐⇒ ∀i∈K∖{ı˘} ∶ h(i) = h′(i)
Thus h = h′ if and only if h(˘ı) = h′(˘ı). But this must hold, for otherwise we would have h′ = hh′(ı˘) ∈ F
by definition of the hj , which contradicts the assumption that h
′
∈ F . Therefore, such an h′ cannot
exist and ∣F ∣ = (d − 1) ⋅ ∣F ∣.
The failure probability bound in (2) is tight: if the only difference between the two inputs is the
key of a single item, then the probability that the hash values of the new and old key are the same
(and the modification thus goes unnoticed) is 1/d. This follows from the uniformity of random hash
functions.
Lemma 3. Checking ⊕-reduction with ⊕ as in Theorem 1, n input pairs, and k keys, using d
buckets, with moduli in (rˆ,2rˆ] and probability of failure at most δ > 0, is possible in time
O((n
p
+ βd log(2rˆ)) log( 1
rˆ
+ 1
d
)−1 δ
−1 + α log p) .
Proof. From the above description we can see that a single iteration of the checker requires time
O(n/p) to hash and locally reduce the input, and Tcoll(d log(2rˆ)) = O(βd log(2rˆ) +α log p) for the
reduction. By repeating the procedure ⌈log( 1
rˆ
+ 1
d
)−1 δ
−1⌉ times, we can increase the probability of
detecting an incorrect result to at least 1 − δ by accepting only if all repetitions of the procedure
declare the result to be likely correct. To keep the number of messages to a minimum, we can
execute all instances of the checker simultaneously (this also means that we only have to read the
input once), and perform their reductions at the same time.
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Table 2: Some numerically determined optimal values for bucket
count d and modulus parameter rˆ given a message size of b bits.
b δ d rˆ #its achieved δ
1024 10−4 37 28 3 3.0 ⋅ 10−5
1024 10−6 25 27 5 2.5 ⋅ 10−7
1024 10−8 18 27 7 4.1 ⋅ 10−9
1024 10−10 14 26 10 2.5 ⋅ 10−11
1024 10−20 6 24 32 3.3 ⋅ 10−21
4096 10−6 124 210 3 7.4 ⋅ 10−7
4096 10−10 68 29 6 2.1 ⋅ 10−11
4096 10−20 32 28 14 4.4 ⋅ 10−21
16384 10−7 420 212 3 1.8 ⋅ 10−8
16384 10−10 273 211 5 1.2 ⋅ 10−12
16384 10−20 148 210 10 7.6 ⋅ 10−22
16384 10−30 93 210 16 1.3 ⋅ 10−31
65536 10−10 1170 213 4 9.1 ⋅ 10−13
65536 10−20 630 212 8 1.3 ⋅ 10−22
65536 10−30 420 212 12 1.1 ⋅ 10−31
65536 10−40 321 211 17 2.9 ⋅ 10−42
We can instantiate this checker in different ways to obtain the characteristics we wish. First, we
use this to show Theorem 1:
Proof (Theorem 1). The theorem follows from Lemma 3 with d ≤ rˆ ≤ 2w−1 and (1
rˆ
+ 1
d
)−1 < d.
We can also minimize bottleneck communication volume and find that minimum at d = 2 buckets,
rˆ = 8 for a modulus range of 9..16, and thus a minireduction result size of 8 bits with log1.6 δ
−1
repetitions. However, this high number of repetitions causes a lot of local work. Further, the
practical usefulness of sending single bytes across the network is questionable. In effect, real-world
interconnects have an effective minimum message size b, such that sending fewer than b bits is not
measurably faster than sending a message of size b bits. Thus, our goal should be to minimize
the number of iterations—⌈log 1
rˆ
+ 1
d
δ⌉—under the constraint that the result size be close to b bits:
d ⌈log(2rˆ)⌉ ⌈log 1
rˆ
+ 1
d
δ⌉ ≤ b. This relation can be used to (numerically) compute optimal choices of rˆ
and d for given b. Table 2 shows such values for some interesting choices of b and δ. However, in
practice, keeping local work low might be more important than these solutions to minimize δ admit,
and one might prefer to trade a reduced number of iterations for a larger value of d and perhaps
choose rˆ = 231.
Optimizations Multiple instances of this algorithm can be executed concurrently by using a hash
function that computes c ⋅ ⌈log d⌉ bits. Its value can then be interpreted as c concatenated hash
values for separate instances, enabling bit-parallel implementation. It is also possible to use Single
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Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) techniques to further reduce local work. Refer to Section 7 for
specific implementation details.
5 Permutation and Sorting
Many approaches for permutation checking exist in the sequential case, and often directly imply
communication efficient equivalents. Perhaps most elegantly and first described by Wegman and
Carter [22]—albeit in a less general manner than we prove here—we can use a random hash function
and compare the sum of hash values in the input and output sequences. Once we have established
that a sequence is a permutation of another, verifying sortedness of the output sequence only requires
that each PE receive the smallest element of its successor PE and compare its local maximum to it.
Lemma 4. Let E = ⟨e1, . . . , en⟩ and O = ⟨o1, . . . , on⟩ be two sequences of n elements from a universe
U . Then, for a random hash function h ∶ U → 0..H − 1, define λ ∶= ∑ni=1 h(ei) − h(oi) in FH = Z/HZ
( i.e., mod H), and
P [λ = 0] =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1 if E is a permutation of O
H−1 otherwise.
Proof. First define h(X) ∶= ∑x∈X h(x) for any set or sequence X. If E and O are permutations of
each other, then h(E) = h(O) due to commutativity of addition, and thus λ = 0 by associativity.
Otherwise, when interpreted as sets, E and O each consist of a set of shared and private elements:
E = S ∪ PE , O = S ∪ PO, with PE ∩ PO = ∅. By commutativity, the shared elements contribute the
same value h(S) to both sums of hash values: h(E) = h(S)+h(PE) and h(O) = h(S)+h(PO). Since
PE and PO are disjoint sets and h is a random hash function, h(PE) and h(PO) are independent
and uniformly distributed over 0..H − 1, and thus equal with probability 1/H. The same thus also
holds for h(E) and h(O).
Every PE can compute the sum for its O(n/p) local elements independently (see Section 2). A
sum all-reduction modulo H over these values then yields s. The algorithm can thus be executed
in time O(n/p + β logH +α log p).
However, this algorithm requires confidence in the randomness of the hash function h. If we do
not have access to a sufficiently trusted hash function, we can use a different approach based on
constructing a polynomial from E and O, commonly attributed to R.J. Lipton, and essentially a
solution to Exercise 5.5 in Mehlhorn and Sanders [23].
Lemma 5. For two sequences E = ⟨e1, . . . , en⟩ and O = ⟨o1, . . . , on⟩ from a universe 0..U − 1 and
any δ > 0, choose a prime r >max(n/δ,U − 1) and define the polynomial
q(z) ∶= n∏
i=1
(z − ei) −
n
∏
i=1
(z − oi) mod r.
Then for random z ∈ 0..r − 1,
P [q(z) = 0]
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
= 1 if E is a permutation of O
< δ otherwise.
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Proof. If E is a permutation of O, then both products have the same factors and thus q(z) = 0 for
all z by commutativity of multiplication. Otherwise, because r is larger than any ei or oi (this is
important to ensure that no pair i, j with ei ≡ oj mod r exists) is prime, q is a non-zero polynomial
of degree n in the field Fr. Such a polynomial has at most n roots.
2 Thus the probability of q(z) = 0
is at most n
r
<
n
n/δ = δ.
Instead of doing 2n expensive multiplication-modulo-prime operations, one could also consider
using carry-less multiplication in a Galois Field GF(2ℓ) with an irreducible polynomial. Multiplic-
ation in Galois Fields can be implemented very efficiently, e.g. using Intel SIMD instructions [24].
Theorem 6. It is possible to check whether a sequence of n elements is a permutation of another such
sequence with probability at least 1 − δ in time O((n/(pw) + β) log 1
δ
+ α log p) =∶ Tcheck-perm(n,p, δ).
Proof. We can boost the success probabilities of the algorithms from Lemmata 4 and 5 arbitrarily
by executing several independent instances and accepting only if all instances do. Batching com-
munication keeps latency to log p. Choose H = 2w in Lemma 4 to obtain the claimed bound. In
Lemma 5, choose δ = 2−w+1n. Then, r can always be chosen in [2w−1,2w] by Bertrand’s postulate,
and a machine word can hold the values.
Theorem 7. Checking whether a sequence of n elements is a sorted version of another such sequence
with probability ≥ 1 − δ is possible in time Tcheck-sort(n,p, δ) ∶= O(Tcheck-perm(n,p, δ)).
Proof. After verifying the permutation property using Theorem 6, it remains to be checked whether
the elements are sorted. First, verify that the local data is sorted in time O(n/p). Then, trans-
mit the locally smallest element to the preceding PE, and receive the smallest element of the
next PE. Compare this to the locally largest element. Lastly, verify that no PE rejected using a
gather operation. In total, this requires time O(Tcheck-perm(n,p, δ)) + O(n/p) + 2βw + 2α + Tcoll =
O(Tcheck-perm(n,p, δ)).
6 Further Checkers
There are many operations for which we can construct checkers from the sum aggregation and
permutation checker. We discuss several in the following subsections. Afterwards, we turn to some
invasive checkers, i.e. checkers that do not treat the operation as a black box, and instead check
only part of the operation. While less desirable than true checkers, these checkers allows us to
broaden the range of covered operations.
6.1 Average Aggregation
Computing the per-key averages is impossible to express in a scalar reduction, but becomes easy
when replacing (key, value)-pairs with (key, value, count)-triples and using the reduce function ⊕ with
(k1, v1, c1) ⊕ (k1, v2, c2) ∶= (k1, v1 + v2, c1 + c2). The computation is then followed up by an output
function h with h(k1, v1, c1) ∶= (k1, v1/c1). This avoids the use of the much more communication-
expensive GroupBy function.
2This can easily be seen by induction. It is easy to verify for n ≤ 1. Now let q be a polynomial of degree n ≥ 2,
and a be a root of q (if none exists, we are finished). Then q = q′ ⋅ (X − a) for some polynomial q′ of degree n − 1,
and by the induction hypothesis, q′ has at most n − 1 roots. For some b ∈ Fr, q(b) = q
′(b) ⋅ (b − a) is zero iff a = b or
q′(b) = 0. Thus q has at most n roots.
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Checking average aggregation is easy when these per-key element counts are available in a
certificate, for then we can reconstruct the result of a sum aggregation by undoing the final division—
termed h above—by multiplying the average value with the count for every key. As described above,
this certificate naturally arises during computation anyway, and thus does not impose overhead on
the average computation. Now we can leverage the sum checker, applying it both to the input
sequence and the reconstructed sums. As the product is computed component-wise, both the
asserted averages and the certificate can be supplied in distributed form, as long as both values are
available at the same PE for any key.
To prevent accidental mismatches when both averages and counts are scaled in a way that
yields the same reconstructed sums—e.g. double the averages and halve the counts—, we also need
to check the correctness of the counts. Therefore, we also need to apply the count aggregation
checker to the input and the certificate. The same can also be achieved in a single step by applying
the (key, value, count)-triple aggregation trick using the reduce function ⊕ described above to the
checker.
Corollary 8. For a given input sequence of n key-value pairs ⟨e1, . . . , en⟩ with ei = (ki, vi), keys
ki ∈ K, and k ∶= ∣K ∣, it is possible to check whether a set of k asserted per-key averages ⟨a1, . . . , ak⟩
is correct if the number of values associated with each key is available as a certificate ⟨c1, . . . , ck⟩,
by supplying ⟨(e1,1), . . . , (en,1)⟩ as input and ⟨(a1 ⋅ c1, c1), . . . , (ak ⋅ ck, ck)⟩ as output to the sum
aggregation checker of Section 4, achieving the time complexity and success probability of Theorem 1.
6.2 Minimum and Maximum Aggregation
Now consider computing the minimum or maximum value per key (w.l.o.g., we shall only consider
minima henceforth). This is a surprisingly difficult operation to check. Clearly, the sum aggregation
checker of Section 4 is not directly applicable, as the min function does not satisfy the requirement
min(a, b) ≠ a if b ≥ a. To check min-aggregation, we need to verify for each key that (a) no elements
smaller than the purported minimum exist, as well as determine whether (b) the minimum value
does indeed appear in the input sequence. Both subproblems seem to require the asserted result
to be known at all PEs. Let S = ⟨x1, . . . , xn⟩ be the input sequence, and M = ⟨m1, . . . ,mk⟩ the
asserted output. Given M , property (a) is easy to verify by iterating the locally present part of S
and verifying that no element exists with a value smaller than the entry of its key in M .
However, property (b) is surprisingly hard to check using o(k) bits of communication (it is easy
to verify in time O(n/p + βk +α log p) using a bitwise or reduction—see Section 2—on a bitvector
of size k specifying which keys’ minima are present locally, and testing whether each bit is set
in the result). A certificate in the form of the locations of the minima, available in full at every
PE, remedies this. Each PE then needs to verify its set of local asserted minima. The certificate
is required to be available in full at every PE so that we can ensure that all keys are covered—
otherwise, a faulty algorithm might simply “forget” a key, and the checker would not be able to
notice.
Theorem 9. Checking minimum (maximum) aggregation is possible in time O(n/p +α log p) provided
that the asserted output and a certificate specifying which PE holds the minimum (maximum) ele-
ment for any key are available at all PEs.
Proof. Follows directly from the above discussion.
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def checkMedian(v : Element[ni], o : Map⟨Key→Value⟩, δ : R) : Boolean
s : Map⟨Key → Z⟩ using default value 0 for unknown keys, size k
foreach (key, value) ∈ v –– combine mapping and local reduction
if val < o[key ] then s[key ] = s[key ]−1
if val > o[key ] then s[key ] = s[key ]+1
return checkSumAgg(s.to_array, ⟨0, . . . ,0⟩ , δ)
Algorithm 2: Pseudocode for the median checker (unique values). The function checkSumAgg is
defined in Algorithm 1. Here, v is the input to the median aggregation operation, a sequence of n
elements of which PE i holds ni; o is the asserted result of size k; and δ is the maximum allowed
failure rate. For simplicity, we use associative arrays indexed by key for o and s.
Note that this checker is not probabilistic and thus guaranteed to notice any errors in the result.
We discuss possibilities for improvement and possible lower bounds in the section on future work
at the end of the paper.
6.3 Median Aggregation
We use the common definition of the median of an even number of elements as the mean of the two
middle elements. Thus there may not exist an element that is equal to the median, but—assuming
unique values—the number of elements smaller than the median is always equal to the number of
larger elements.
If the asserted medians are available at every PE, checking a median aggregation operation on
unique values can be reduced to the sum aggregation problem by verifying the above property.
Simply map elements smaller than their key’s median to −1, and larger elements to +1. Then, the
sum over all of these values must be 0 for every key. This property can be checked probabilist-
ically using the sum aggregation checker of Theorem 1. Pseudocode of our algorithm is given in
Algorithm 2.
Requiring that each value occur no more than once for each key is without loss of generality
because it can be enforced by an appropriate tie breaking scheme. However, the median aggregation
algorithm does not necessarily need to apply the tie breaking scheme during its execution: we only
need to know which occurrence of the median value is the one with rank n/2, as determined by the
chosen tie breaking scheme. Depending on the median aggregation algorithm used3, this can be
much simpler than using the tie breaking scheme in the entire algorithm.
Theorem 10. Median aggregation on a sequence of n elements can be checked with failure probability
at most δ > 0 in time O(Tcheck-sum(n,p, δ)) provided the asserted result is available at every PE. For
non-unique values, tie breaking information on the median values is required as a certificate.
Proof. By definition, an element is the median of a set of unique elements if and only if the number
of elements smaller than it is exactly equal to the number of elements that is larger. This is verified
using the sum aggregation checker by mapping smaller values to −1 and larger values to +1. Ties
are broken using an appropriate tie breaking scheme and the certificate. The claim then follows
from Theorem 1.
3We describe a communication efficient algorithm in [25], which could be executed in parallel for every key
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6.4 Zip
Zipping combines two sequences S1 = ⟨x1, . . . , xn⟩ and S2 = ⟨y1, . . . , yn⟩ of equal length n index-wise,
producing as its result a sequence of pairs S = ⟨(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)⟩. However, since S1 and S2
need not have the same data distribution over the PEs, this is nontrivial. Thus, the elements of (at
least) one sequence need to be moved in the general case. Checking Zip therefore requires verifying
that the order of the elements is unchanged in both sequences. For this, we require a hash function
that can be evaluated in parallel on distributed data, independent of how the input is split over the
PEs. One example would be the inner product of the input and a sequence of n random values,
R = ⟨r1, . . . , rn⟩, where ri = h′(i) for some high-quality hash function h′ [9]. This way, R can be
computed on the fly and without communication.
Theorem 11. Checking Zip(S1,S2) with ∣S1∣ = ∣S2∣ = n with false positive probability of at most
δ > 0 can be achieved in time O( n
pw
log 1
δ
+ β log 1
δ
+ α log p).
Proof. A single iteration of the checker works as follows. Apply the hash function to S1 and the first
part of the elements of S. Computing this hash value is possible in time O(n/p + β logH + α log p)
for the families of hash functions discussed above, where the output of the hash function is in
0..H − 1. The same is applied to S2 and the second part of the elements of S. Accept if both pairs
of hashes match. Again, the success probability can be boosted to δ by executing logH−1
1
δ
instances
of the checker in parallel, and the claimed running time follows for H = 2w.
6.5 Other Operations
We now briefly describe several further operations to which the permutation and sort checker can
be adapted. For the latter two, we present invasive checkers for the element redistribution phase.
The rest of the operation needs to be checked with an appropriate local checker.
6.5.1 Union
Verifying whether a multiset S is the union of two other multisets S1 and S2 of size n1 and n2,
respectively, is equivalent to checking whether S is a permutation of the concatenation of S1 and
S2. We can therefore adapt the permutation checker of Section 5 to iterate over two input sets.
Corollary 12. The Union(S1,S2) operation can be checked in time O(Tcheck-perm(∣S1∣ + ∣S2∣ , p, δ)),
where Tcheck-perm(n,p, δ) is the the time to check permutations of size n from Theorem 6.
6.5.2 Merge
A Merge operation combines two sorted sequences S1 and S2 of length n1 and n2, respectively, into
a single sorted sequence S of length n1 + n2. Checking it is thus equal to verifying that S is sorted
and the union of S1 and S2, c.f. the previous subsection.
Corollary 13. Checking Merge(S1,S2) with probability at least 1 − δ is possible in time
O(Tcheck-sort(∣S1∣ + ∣S2∣ , p, δ)) .
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6.5.3 GroupBy
TheGroupBy operation is conceptually similar to aggregation (see Section 4), but passes all elements
with the same key to the group function g ∶ [Value] → Value. Thus, for every key, all elements
associated with it need to be sent to a single PE. This stage of a GroupBy operation can therefore
be checked using the sort checker, where the order is induced by the hash function assigning keys
to PEs. The group function needs to be checked separately by an appropriate local checker, which
falls outside the scope of this paper.
Corollary 14. Checking the redistribution phase of GroupBy on a sequence of n elements with
probability at least 1 − δ is possible in time O(Tcheck-sort(n,p, δ)).
6.5.4 Join
Similarly to GroupBy, we can design an invasive checker for element redistribution in Join opera-
tions. The two common approaches to joins are the sort-merge join and hash join algorithm [26].
Note that the sort checker can be used for both approaches, because as far as data redistribution is
concerned, a hash join is essentially a sort-merge join using the hashes of the keys for sorting. To
further verify that the distribution of keys to PEs is the same for both input sequences, we exchange
the locally largest (smallest) keys with the following (preceding) PE and check that those are larger
(smaller) than the local maximum (minimum). The correctness of the element redistribution then
follows from their global sortedness.
Corollary 15. Checking the input redistribution phase of a hash or sort-merge Join on two sequences
of n1 and n2 elements with success probability at least 1−δ is possible in time O(Tcheck-sort(n1 + n2, p, δ)).
7 Experiments
We developed implementations of our core checkers, sum aggregation and sorting. These were in-
tegrated into Thrill [3], an open source data-parallel big data processing framework4 using modern
C++ and developed at Karlsruhe Institute of Technology. Thrill provides a high-performance envir-
onment that allows for easy implementation and testing of our methods, while offering a convenient
high-level interface to users.
Goals The aim of our experiments is twofold. First, to show that our checkers achieve the pre-
dicted detection accuracy, and second, to demonstrate their practicability by showing that very
little overhead is introduced by using a checker.
Manipulators To test the efficacy of our checkers, we implemented manipulators that purpose-
fully interfere with the computation and deliberately introduce faults. Manipulators are a flexible
way to introduce a wide variety of classes of faults, allowing us to test our hypotheses on which
kinds of faults are hardest to detect. It is easy to convince oneself that large-scale manipulation
of the result is much easier to detect than subtle changes. Thus, our manipulators focus on the
latter kind of change in the data. The specific manipulation techniques used with an operation are
described in the respective subsections.
4See http://project-thrill.org and https://github.com/thrill/thrill/ for details. Our code is available
at https://github.com/lorenzhs/thrill/tree/checkers
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Table 3: Configurations tested for Sum Aggregation checker.
First set was used for accuracy tests, second set for scaling tests.
Configuration Table size Failure rate Comment
(#its×d m log rˆ) (bits) (δ)
1×2 m31 64 5 ⋅ 10−1 High rˆ is less effective than
1×4 m31 128 2.5 ⋅ 10−1 Ç multiple iterations
4×2 m4 40 1 ⋅ 10−1 Lower δ and size than above
4×4 m3 64 2 ⋅ 10−2 δ = 2% for 64-bit table
4×4 m5 96 6 ⋅ 10−3
4×8 m3 128 3.9 ⋅ 10−3
4×8 m5 192 6 ⋅ 10−4
4×8 m7 256 3.1 ⋅ 10−4
5×16 m5 480 7.2 ⋅ 10−6
6×32 m9 1920 1.3 ⋅ 10−9
8×16 m15 2048 2.3 ⋅ 10−10
4×256 m15 16384 2.4 ⋅ 10−10
5×128 m11 7680 3.9 ⋅ 10−11
8×256 m15 32769 5.8 ⋅ 10−20 lower local work, larger size
16×16 m15 4096 5.4 ⋅ 10−20 higher local work, smaller size
Table 4: Manipulators for Sum Aggregation Checker
Name Manipulation applied
Bitflip Flips a random bit in the input
RandKey randomize the key of a random element
SwitchValues switches the values of two random elements
IncKey increments the key of a random element
IncDecn acts on 2n elements with distinct keys,
Ç using n = 1 incrementing the keys n elements and
Ç and n = 2 decrementing that of n other elements
Implementation Details As hash functions, we used CRC-32C, which is implemented in hard-
ware in newer x86 processors with support for SSE 4.2 [27], and tabulation hashing [22, 28] with
256 entries per table and four or eight tables for 32 and 64-bit values, respectively. We abbreviate
the hash functions with “CRC”, “Tab”, and “Tab64”. Where needed, pseudo-random numbers are
obtained from an MT19937 Mersenne Twister [29].
Platform We conducted our scaling experiments on up to 128 nodes of bwUniCluster, each of
which features two 14-core Intel Xeon E5–2660 v4 processors and 128GiB of DDR4 main memory.
For our overhead and accuracy experiments, we used an AMD Ryzen 7 1800X octacore machine
with 64GiB of DDR4 RAM. The code was compiled with g++ 7.1.0 in release mode.
7.1 Sum Aggregation
We implemented the sum aggregation checker of Section 4. As workload, we chose integers distrib-
uted according to a power law distribution, with frequency f(k;N) = 1/(kHN) for the element of
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Table 5: Overhead of sum aggregation checker: checker local input
processing time for 106 pairs of 64-bit integers, 10000 runs
Configuration (see Table 3) Time per element [ns] Approx. #cycles
5×16 CRC m5 4.5 16
6×32 CRC m9 4.6 17
8×16 CRC m15 5.1 18
4×256 CRC m15 3.8 14
5×128 Tab64 m11 4.7 17
8×256 Tab64 m15 7.3 26
16×16 Tab64 m15 10.0 36
rank k. Here, N is the number of possible elements and HN is the N -th harmonic number. This
distribution naturally models many workloads, e.g. wordcount over natural languages.
The tested configurations of the checker—number of iterations, number of buckets, hash function,
and modulus parameter—are listed in Table 3. The first set of configurations was used for testing
detection accuracy, the second for scaling experiments.
Implementation Details To minimize local work, our implementation employs bit-parallelism
where possible, e.g., instead of computing eight four-bit hash values, we compute one 32-bit hash
value and partition it into eight groups of four bits, which we treat as the output of the hash
functions. This is implemented in a generic manner to satisfy any partition of a hash value into
groups. Since 64 hash bits suffice to guarantee a failure probability of nearly 10−20 (see Table 3),
evaluating a single hash function suffices in all practically relevant configurations.
To minimize the cost of adding modulo r, we use 64-bit values for the buckets internally, add
normally, and perform the expensive modulo step only if the addition would overflow. This can be
detected cheaply with a jump-on-overflow instruction.
Detection Accuracy The manipulators we used are listed in Table 4. Fig. 3 demonstrates that
our checkers achieve the theoretically predicted performance in practice, even when using hash
functions with weaker guarantees. We can see that Lemma 2 generally overestimates the failure
probability introduced by the modulus. Note that the significance of the results for configurations
with low δ is limited, as the expected number of failures in 100000 runs for e.g. 4×8 Tab m7 is
only 31.1.
We note that CRC-32C appears to work very well for subtle manipulations, which is likely
because it was designed so that small changes in the input cause many output bits to change. This
makes it likely that a change in an element’s key causes it to be sent to a different bucket in at
least one iteration. However, the least significant bits appear to change in similar ways for different
inputs, as indicated by the IncDec1 measurements, causing an elevated failure rate in this setting.
Tabulation hashing performs quite uniformly well across the board, which is not entirely unexpected
given its high degree of independence.
Overhead We measured the sequential overhead of the sum aggregation checker on the aforemen-
tioned AMD machine, as single-node performance on bwUniCluster proved to be too inconsistent
to yield useful results (this is likely due to thermal limitations). The results are shown in Table 5.
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Fig. 4: Weak scaling experiment for Sum Aggregation checker with 125000 items per PE,
following a Zipf (power law) distribution. Average over 1000 runs.
The configurations used provide high confidence in the correctness of the result and cover a wide
range of practically relevant parameter choices. We can see that δ < 10−10 can be achieved with
less than 5 ns per element on this 3.6GHz machine. A configuration with very small table size
(512 Bytes) and thus very little communication, with δ ≈ 5 ⋅ 10−20, can be realized with as little
as 10 ns per element, approximately 36 cycles. For comparison, the main reduce operation takes
approximately 88 ns per element using a single core of the same machine. This surprisingly low
overhead was achieved by carefully engineering our implementation as described in Section 7.1. A
naive implementation would likely cause at least one order of magnitude more overhead.
Scaling Behavior We performed weak scaling experiments, the results of which are shown in
Fig. 4. These measurements suffer from a noticeable amount of noise because reduction and checker
are interleaved—elements are forwarded to the checker as they are passed to the reduction. This is
necessitated by the design of Thrill, as in related Big Data frameworks. As a result, we measure
the entire reduce-check pipeline, the running time of which is influenced by multiple sources of
variability, including the network, causing the aforementioned noise. We note that the results
for a single node remain consistent with the sequential overhead measurements of the preceding
paragraph.
It is clearly visible that the overhead introduced by the checkers is within the fluctuations
introduced by the network and other sources of noise. Furthermore, starting with four nodes, data
exchange for the reduction dominates overall running time, which becomes nearly independent from
the checker’s configuration and thus accuracy, although some impact of the number of iterations
on running time remains visible. Nonetheless, the average overhead over all configurations is a
mere 1.1% when using more than a single node. Observe that even the slowest and most accurate
configuration, “16×16 Tab64 m15” with δ < 6 ⋅10−20, thus providing near-certainty in the correctness
of the result, adds only 2.4% to the average running time on two or more nodes.
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Table 6: Manipulators for Sort/Permutation Checker
Name Manipulation applied
Bitflip Flips a random bit in the input
Increment increment some element’s value
Randomize set some element to a random value
Reset reset some element to the default value (0)
SetEqual set some element equal to a different one
7.2 Permutation and Sorting
In this subsection, we evaluate the permutation and sorting checker of Section 5 with a workload
of 106 integers chosen uniformly at random from the interval 0..108 − 1. We implemented a single
iteration of the hash-based permutation and sorting checker of Lemma 4, and truncate the output
of the hash function to H bits for different values of H. Manipulations are applied before sorting
in order to test the permutation checker and not the trivial sortedness check.
Detection Accuracy We measured detection accuracy of the sort checker using CRC-32C and
tabulation hashing, two fast real-world hash functions with limited randomness. Our experiments in
Appendix A show that tabulation hashing provides sufficient randomness to achieve the theoretically
predicted detection accuracy on all tested manipulators. We further observe that CRC-32C does
not seem to provide sufficient randomness for all of the manipulators listed in Table 6. In particular,
we observed a significantly increased failure rate using the Increment manipulator where a single
element of the input was incremented by 1. No significant deviations from expected performance
were observed for the other manipulators.
Running Time On the aforementioned AMD machine, the overhead for local processing of input
and output of the sorting operation was 2.0 ns per element for CRC32, and 2.8 ns when using 32-
bit tabulation hashing. This corresponds to roughly 3.5% of total running time when considering
100 000 elements. As the time spent on the hash function does not depend on how many of its
output bits are used, the configuration did not have measurable impact on the running time.
We do not present scaling experiments for the permutation checker, as the only communication
is a global reduction on a single integer value and one message sent and received per PE, both also
containing exactly one integer value.
8 Conclusions
We have shown that probabilistic checking of many distributed big data operations is possible in a
communication efficient manner. Our experiments show excellent scaling and that the running time
overhead of the checkers in a distributed setting is below 5% for sum aggregation and sorting, even
when near-certainty in the correctness of the result is required. Accuracy guarantees predicted by
theoretical analysis are achieved in practice even when using hash functions with limited randomness,
and memory overhead is negligible. The basic methods used in our checkers are extremely simple,
making manual verification of the correctness of the checker feasible. The existence of such checkers
could speed up the development cycles of operations in big data processing frameworks by providing
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correctness checks and allowing for graceful degradation at execution time by falling back to a simpler
but slower method should a computation fail.
Future Work
Lower bounds on communication volume and latency for probabilistic distributed checkers would
offer some insight into how far from an optimal solution our checkers are. Furthermore, it would
be interesting to see whether more operations can be checked without the need for a certificate
or requiring the purported result to be available at each PE. For example, could a probabilistic
minimum aggregation checker with sublinear communication exist?
It would also be interesting to know whether the sum aggregation checker can be adapted for
other data types such as floating point numbers without suffering from numerical instability issues
such as catastrophic cancellation.
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A Permutation Checker Accuracy
In Figure 5 we show the results of accuracy experiments for the permutation checker as described
in Section 7.2. This verifies whether the hash functions used provide sufficient randomness to
detect manipulations. As discussed in Section 7.2, we can see that CRC-32C does not provide
sufficient randomness to detect off-by-one errors in element values as simulated using the Increment
manipulator (see Table 6).
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Fig. 5: Accuracy of the Permutation/Sort checker for different manipulators. Uniformly distributed
input with 108 possible values, 106 input elements, 4 PEs, 100 000 iterations for each manipulator.
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